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lic services in a growth model with human capital accumulation where heteroge-
neous individuals decide whether to attend a publicly funded education regime or
a privately funded one. Heterogeneity of individuals is introduced via their status-
motivation which is shown to aﬀect their choice of education. In such a framework,
we obtain an inverted-U shaped relationship between growth and the size of the
public education sector. In contrast with the general wisdom: we show that a larger
public education sector is compatible with both a reduction of inequalities and an
increase of long-term growth. Although we demonstrate that in a majoritarian sys-
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which maximises growth, our analysis also highlights the tension between the direct
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1 Introduction
The role of human capital in promoting growth and economic development is a long-
established theme since at least Lucas (1988). The main mechanism for supporting hu-
man capital is education; empirical evidence on this connection has been presented by
a number of authors such as Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Besides
fostering growth, education can reduce inequalities. In this respect, the government can
play a crucial role, as it has been established by the early contributions of Schultz (1961,
1963, 1964). By providing free access to public education, the government allows those
who would not have the necessary resources to invest in education otherwise, to acquire
knowledge and skills. In other words, as education is uniformly provided, it smooths
inequalities, and thus is egalitarian, as it has been theoretically and empirically shown
by several authors such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993),
Zhang (1996), Gradstein and Justman (1997) and Sylwester (2002). The primary concern
of these papers, however, is the analysis of the eﬀect of diﬀerent education alternatives
such as public versus private education on subsequent inequality. Although the choice
of educational system is endogenous and made via a majority voting system, the fact
remains that, in these contributions, only one system of education prevails in equilibrium.
In the present paper, we seek to combine the hitherto rather separate strands of lit-
erature that investigate the eﬀects of government expenditure on education on growth
and distribution. Contrary to the papers cited above, our focus is on a mixed regime of
education. Our point of departure is similar to Cardak (2004) and Chen (2005). Specifi-
cally, we argue that the structure of the educational system is an important determinant
of the growth-inequality relationship which is itself a vexed issue not fully clarified in the
literature.1 The role of public education in this relationship is pivotal. Given the impor-
tance of the issue, the likely multiplicity of mechanisms involved and the critical role of
public education in this regard, it should be of value to develop alternative and comple-
mentary approaches to tackle the problem. In that sense, this paper brings forward the
social status motive as an explanation for the education regime choice of individuals and
investigates the choice of the size of public education under majority voting. As we will
see, the ’status’ channel can complement the one suggested by Cardak (2004) and Chen
(2005) and can have diﬀerent implications for the growth-inequality relationship.2
The social status motive has recently received considerable attention, as it has been
recognised that, in addition to individual consumption postulated by standard theory, an
agent’s utility function may also depend on the individual’s position in the distribution
(see, e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; Choudhary et al., 2007; Maurer
and Meier, 2008). It has been variously termed ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ or ‘status-
1See, for instance, Tsoukis and Tournemaine (2012) for a discussion and more references on this issue
and also footnote 18.
2In Cardak’s (2004) framework, those in private education experience growth via a standard linear
mechanism, while in the public one they experience growth via a spillover eﬀect. It is shown that het-
erogeneity in initial endowment of human capital results in a kind of polarization in income distribution.
Chen (2005) focuses on credit market imperfections and the influence of financial development. He shows
that, to reduce inequality, the government should induce individuals to attend public schools.
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seeking’ (see, e.g., Abel, 1990; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2008).
It is by now widely thought that such motives may have important eﬀects related to both
growth and distribution (see, e.g., Futagami and Shibata, 1998; Corneo and Jeanne, 1999;
Pham, 2005; Tournemaine and Tsoukis, 2010). Moreover, as shown by Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2004), such eﬀects also impact the speed of convergence of an economy and the
kind of response we can expect when a shock occurs.
In this paper, we argue that there is an important interplay between the choice of
education regime and the structure of social interactions.3 In this vein, we concur with
Bernal (2005) who explains that middle and upper social classes prefer to send their
children to private education, while poorer populations including ethnic minorities and
immigrants attend the public education sector for free. Similarly, Ball (1993, 1997) and
Ball, Bower and Gewrirtz (1995) establish that the choice of education system in the US
or UK can be interpreted as a way to maintain or even boost social status. In the same
spirit, Anderson (1988) uses Australian data to show the importance of the connections
between status, religious beliefs and choice of education regime.
To capture these features, we develop a model with human capital accumulation where
heterogeneous individuals must choose between a publicly funded education system and a
privately funded one. Heterogeneity across individuals is introduced via an idiosyncratic
parameter measuring their status-motivation. Interestingly, although simple, our model is
rich enough to allow the examination of a number of important and various issues, namely
the relation between the size of the government and growth, the growth-inequality nexus
and political economy issues.4
Our main results may indeed be summarised as follows. In contrast with Chen (2005)
who finds a monotonic relationship between growth and the size of the public education
system (defined here by the level of income tax rate), we obtain an inverted-U relationship.
Thus, in contrast with Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993),
Zhang (1996), but in line with Gradstein and Justman (1997), we show that a higher
level of growth and lower inequality can be mutually compatible when the government
promotes public education.5 The rationale behind our result is similar to that in Barro
(1990): Due to productive public services, higher government spending benefits growth
when the economy is starved of such services; gradually, however, as diminishing returns
set in, the tax-related disincentives from such policies begin to dominate. In investigating
the growth-maximising tax rate, we find that its level depends on the contribution of
3The notion that ‘status’ considerations also aﬀect the level of education of individuals has been
investigated by Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) and Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2009). However,
the idea of a choice between private and public education and its consequences on growth and distribution
has been overlooked by this literature.
4Our framework can also be related to the literature on government versus private provision of public
goods (see, e.g., Devarajan et al., 1998; Chatterjee and Morshed, 2011). An important diﬀerence of these
frameworks with ours, though, is that they do not consider either the possibility of parallel investments
(public-private) which may interact with each other, or the issue of distribution.
5De la Croix and Doepke (2004) also show that higher expenditures in public education promotes
growth. In their framework, this outcome arises when inequality is high, and is due to a reduction in
fertility diﬀerentials not formalised in this paper.
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education in the production function (in the spirit of Barro, 1990), but also on the relative
size of the public- and private- education attending groups, as those aﬀect the eﬀective
size of the education spillover.
Considering a model with heterogeneous individuals, however, allows us to depart
significantly from a Barro-type analysis: we can indeed raise political economy issues.
Thus, our framework can be related to the large literature initiated by Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) which focuses on the distributive conflict between individuals and the resulting
relationship between growth and inequalities.6 While Alesina and Rodrik (1994) point
out the potential conflicts on the size of the public sector between capitalists and workers
who benefit from public expenditures, in our framework the conflicts arise between the
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from public education. Those who benefit from the
public education system prefer a larger public sector (i.e. more tax), while those who
attend the private education system prefer a smaller size. Furthermore, in a majority
voting system whereby individuals vote for the size of the public education system, we
show that all individuals agree on a tax level which is lower than the one which maximises
growth. In light of this result, a corollary is that there is no trade-oﬀ between growth
and equity, i.e. our framework shows that a higher level of growth and a lower level of
inequality can be mutually compatible when the government promotes public education.
We arrive at this conclusion from two angles: Because of the educational spillover, a more
widely-shared education promotes growth; moreover, in the most plausible scenario, we
are in the upward-sloping section of the tax-growth inverted U-shaped relation.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce the model in Section
2. In Section 3, we derive and analyse the equilibrium properties of a mixed regime of
education with respect to growth, distribution and the size of the public education system.
We conclude in Section 4.
2 Model
We consider a closed economy in continuous time populated by a mass [0 1] of infinitely-
lived individuals. Time, denoted by  goes from zero to infinity. We assume that there
are two groups of identical individuals denoted by   = 1 2 diﬀerentiated by their
valuations of status in consumption (see below). Group 1 has a size  and group 2 has a
size 1−  Each individual is initially endowed with  units of labour-time and 0  0
units of human capital. Each individual engages in the production of an output, , that
can be consumed, , or allocated to fund schooling activities in order to acquire new
units of human capital, .
There are two types of education: a public (publicly funded) one, and a private (pri-
vately funded) one. Everybody pays an income tax at rate   0 which is used to fund
6See also the influencial work by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) on the choice of individuals with respect
to the government’s profile of public spendings.
7This finding shares some similarities with that of Benabou (2002) who, however, does not consider
status motive as a source of inequality among individuals.
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public education. We assume that the budget constraint of the government is balanced
at each moment, i.e. the amount spent in public education matches exactly the amount
of funds collected at each moment (see below). All individuals can benefit from the pub-
lic educational system. Individuals, however, who attend the private educational system
must pay additional educational expenses in the form of a fraction of their income:   0.
It is worthwhile to mention that  is a parameter of choice for individuals who are in
private education, and who still pay the tax rate  . Obviously,  = 0 for individuals
who are in public education. Thereby, the level of human capital of people depends on
their choice of education (private or public).
In what follows, we borrow the technology of public education set by Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992). We implicitly assume that the level of human capital of individuals
who opt for the publicly funded educational system evolves across time but is common
across all participants in that system:  =  for any individual in public education.
In contrast, for individuals who are in the private educational system, the level of human
capital is determined by the level of expenditures, . As we will see, the human
capital obtained in private education is in general larger than that obtained under public
education (   ). This is an intuitive outcome: if this was not the case, individuals
would never make additional expenditures on education (in addition to the tax that
they pay regardless). Therefore, each individual has to solve two optimisation problems:
maximising lifetime utility under each system (public/private), and choosing the one that
gives them highest utility.
Following Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992), we assume that output is produced with a
linear technology of the form:  = , where   0 is a productivity parameter
and  is the labour-time an individual allocates to the production of output.8 The
budget constraint of individual  is given by
 = (1−  − ) (1)
where  = 0 if  =  and   0 if  =  .
The individual technology of human capital in the public sector is given by
•
 =  (2)
where   0 is a productivity parameter and  is the geometric mean level of output in
the economy. For technical simplicity, as in Abel (2005), throughout the paper we apply
a standard geometric mean aggregation rule:  = (1) (2)1−.9
The law of motion of individual human capital in the private education sector is given
by:
•
 =  ()1−
¡¢  (3)
8Like Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992), we do not incorporate physical capital in the production function.
Adding physical capital would complicate, but not “wash away”, the eﬀects we are discussing here.
9An arithmetic average of the form  = 1 + (1 − )2 would complicate the analysis without
altering the results we derive here.
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where 0    1 is the weight of existing human capital,  = (1) (2)1−  relative
to material resources (degree of spillover eﬀect).
Comments are in order here. Firstly, in production function (2), we postulate that
individual human capital produced in the public education regime accumulates depending
on the geometric mean income,  This specification allows us to account implicitly for
a spillover eﬀect of human capital which acts through , and also to avoid a spurious
scale eﬀect whereby a bigger economy (with the same structure) would accumulate human
capital faster.
Introducing spillover eﬀects in the form of mean human capital as implicitly specified
in (2) and explicitly in (3), is common in the growth literature. An additional reason
to introduce such spillover eﬀects is that they are shown to be crucial for human capital
convergence (Tamura, 1991; de la Croix and Doepke, 2004) and have empirical support
(Alonso-Carrera, 2001). Observe that it would be possible to specify a more general
technology of education in the public sector, such as:
•
 = 
¡¢1− ¡¢. Though
this formalisation appears as the counterpart of (3) as individuals get a kind of share
of average output (this share being determined by the level of the tax rate, ) it would
complicate the analysis without modifying our main results. Intuitively, as output is linear
with respect to human capital ( = ), at the aggregate level,  necessarily
depends linearly on mean education  Thus, technology (2) is used for tractability and
must be taken as a short-cut.10
Finally, there is no labour in the production function of either type of education.11
Such human capital technology has been used and discussed by de la Croix and Michel
(2002, see e.g. chapter 5) among others. The main idea is that the existence of teachers
is only implicitly assumed, but they are not explicitly modelled. That is, the standard
trade-oﬀ which occurs between output production (consumption) and education in the
case of a model where labour-time is an input of the human capital accumulation process,
is here (directly) taken into account via the fraction of resources devoted to education.
Preferences of any individual  are represented by,
 =
Z ∞
0
£
log () +  log ¡¢+  ( − )¤ − (4)
where   0 is the rate of time preference,   0 denotes the constant-marginal disutility of
work and  log ¡¢ represents the preference of an individual regarding social status,
where the geometric mean  = (1) (2)1− is taken as given.12 A notable feature in (4)
is that the “status function” is specific to the individual , i.e. the functional form of the
status function (not only the argument inside) diﬀers between individuals. Throughout
10A formal proof that such a change would not aﬀect the main results is given in the appendix.
11A similar formalisation is also widely used in the R&D-based literature where the amount of material
resources taken from the final output often replaces the quantity of labor devoted to research. See for
instance Jones and Williams (1998, 2000).
12Tsoukis (2007) discusses the possibilities for modelling the status function, but here the “multiplica-
tive” formulation (individual as a ratio over average consumption) is assumed for tractability.
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the paper, we assume that 1  2 to capture the notion that individuals of group 2 are
more motivated for status, or antagonistic, or rivalrous than individuals of group 1.
Although, there exist other ways to formalise social status, it is important to mention
that none of the results we derive hinge on our particular specification. As we will see, the
status in consumption induces the more motivated individuals to work more and thus to
accumulate more human capital. This is the same eﬀect as the one we would obtain in a
model where status is defined as: (i) the relative level of human capital of an individual to
that of others (see, e.g., Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss, 1996; Tsoukis and Tournemaine,
2009); or (ii) the relative amount of wealth (physical capital) of an individual to that of
others (see, e.g., Corneo and Jeanne, 1997 and 1999; Pham, 2005, Tournemaine, 2008).
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we solve two optimisation problems, for the typical individual in public ed-
ucation and private education, respectively. Then, we determine which type of educational
regime each individual chooses. To avoid complexity, we investigate the steady-state out-
come and relegate the analysis of the transitional dynamics in Appendix 5.4. The analysis
of the transitional dynamics shows that the equilibrium is a saddle point which is stable
around the steady state.
To proceed, we assume that agents build status-seeking in consumption, as analysed,
into their optimality conditions, taking the geometric means as given. In doing so, they
are also assumed to be able to accurately forecast the relevant aggregate statistics (mean
consumption) one instant ahead.13 The outcome of this process is a Nash equilibrium,
whereby agents respond optimally to aggregate outcomes and, in so doing, reproduce
them (or the distributions from which aggregate statistics are drawn). The assumption of
an (infinitesimal) lag between the time on which information is based and the realisation
of outcomes allows us to avoid explicit game-theoretic considerations (that is, following
Pollack, 1976, p. 310; and the “catching up” model of Abel, 1990).
3.1 Public education
If an individual participates in public education, she gets the standard education output:
 . Thus, the problem of such individual reduces to the choice of consumption, , and
labour-time devoted to output production, , that maximise (4) subject to the budget
constraint given by (1) where  = 0. After some manipulation, we obtain:14
 = 1 +   (5)
13This is the assumption of “rational myopic foresight”, which is a standard hypothesis in macroeco-
nomics, see, e.g., Turnovsky, (1996, Ch. 3) for more discussion.
14Throughout the paper, we use the usual convention of dropping the index of time for constant
variables in steady state.
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Equation (5) says that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of labour allocated to
the production of good equals its marginal cost in utility terms. The marginal benefit
comprises two components: the direct benefit from an additional unit of consumption
plus the indirect gain due to the improvement in social status, .
For future reference, we compute the growth rate of human capital attainable in public
education. From equation (2), we obtain:
 =  
 (6)
3.2 Private education
Individuals who are in the private education regime choose consumption, , labour-time
spent in output production, , but also the share of income to devote to education, ,
and the path for human capital, . The current value Hamiltonian of this problem
is:  = log[() ¡¢ ] + ( − ) + ()1− ¡¢, where 
is the co-state variable associated to the law of motion of human capital (3) and  =
(1−  − ) (see (1)). The first order conditions are:
 
 =
1 + 
 −  + (1− )
•

 = 0
 
 = −
(1 + )
(1−  − ) + (1− )
•

 = 0
 
 =
(1 + )
 + (1− )
•

 = −
• + 
The transversality condition is: lim→∞− = 0.
Under the assumption that the economy is in steady state, we have  = ,  = 
and
•+
•
  = 0 at each instant Using this information, simple manipulations
of the first order conditions yield:
1 + 

1− 
1−  −  =  (7)
1−  − 
 =
 + 
(1− )
 (8)
and, from equation (3), the growth rate of human capital of individual  in private
education is:
 =  ()1−
µ 

¶
 (9)
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In analogy with the problem under public education, equation (7) states that the
marginal benefit of an additional unit of labour allocated to the production of the con-
sumption good equals its marginal cost in utility terms on the right hand side. We note
that (7) coincides with (5) for  = 0. The main diﬀerence between the two problems
comes from an additional equilibrium condition under private education (equation (8))
and the level of the growth rate (equation (9)). The reason is that in the problem under
public education, individuals take the path of education as given. In contrast, under the
private educational system individuals take an active part in the formation of their own
level of education. Such a choice is summarised by equation (8) which is the outcome
between the Euler condition determining the path of accumulation of human capital and
the choice of investments in private education,   0.
3.3 Choice of education regime
Having set out the optimisation of each type of individual conditional on the choice of
the education regime, we now determine what type of education an individual chooses in
the first place. Under the assumption that the economy is in steady state, an important
property is that the level of the growth rates must be common across individuals: we
have  =  =  for all individuals. This outcome results from the presence of the
human capital spillover, , in the technology of production of human capital (2) and
(3): This implies that, as the level of human capital in private education forges ahead of
the average, it acts to slow down its growth rate. As said before, this is likely to bring
a convergence of human capital to common growth rates, as found in the literature (see
Section 2).
Given that we have two types of individual (1 and 2), to determine their choice of
education regime, it is convenient, first, to characterise the threshold level of ambition,
labelled hereafter by e, of a “marginal” or “cutoﬀ” individual, i.e. one who would be in-
diﬀerent between public and private education. The main characteristic of this individual
is that his/her long-run level of welfare is the same in both regimes of education. To be
consistent with our assumptions, we assume that e is such that a share  of individuals
opts for the public education regime while the remaining share 1−  attends the private
regime.15 In that sense, comparing the actual level of ambition of an individual , given
by   = 1 2, to e we will be able to determine which type of education an individual
chooses. To proceed, we assume that the choice of education regime is made once and
for all at the beginning of the planning horizon ( = 0) for all individuals; this presup-
poses perfect foresight, an assumption in line with the deterministic nature of our model.
Specifically, using the utility function (4), straightforward manipulations show that the
marginal individual with ambition e verifiesZ ∞
0
"³
1 + e´ logÃ ee
!
− 
³e − e´# − = 0 (10)
15The details of computing the exact value of e are provided in Appendix 5.1.
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where e and e denote the labour supply of the marginal individual in each regime of
education, and symmetrically e and e denote her level of consumption. Equation
(10) captures the two eﬀects of the long run: consumption considerations favour private
education because the labour supply and human capital are higher in that regime; but
leisure considerations in utility favour public education because under that regime the
individual works less. Had equation (10) been greater (lower) than zero, the utility from
private (public) education would be greater.
As shown in Appendix 5.1, the model-economy described in Section 2 admits the
existence of a unique (saddle) steady state in which individuals face a common rate
of growth  and choose in an endogenous manner the kind of educational regime to
attend. The choice of education regime depends on the individuals’ level of motivation,
  = 1 2, relative to the level of motivation e. As our model-economy comprises two
types of individuals, the following Proposition applies:
Proposition 1: On the individuals’ choice of education regime:
Under the assumption that the government levies a flat tax rate   0 on income,
there exists a unique level of ambition, e so that the individual with ambition e is exactly
indiﬀerent between public and private education. Thus, as 1  2 we have:
(a) If 1  2  e, every individual opts for the public education regime;
(b) If e  1  2, every individual opts for the private education regime;
(c) If 1  e  2, individuals of group 1 opt for public education while individuals of
group 2 opt for private education.
Proof: See Appendix 5.1.
Proposition 1 establishes which type of individual chooses (in an endogenous manner)
which type of education to attend. Cases (a) and (b) represent corner solutions whereby
all individuals opt for the same educational regime while case (c) represents a mixed
regime of education where both public and private education co-exist. In the remainder
of the paper, we restrict our attention to the mixed regime of education (c). The results
we obtain in a pure public regime (a) and in a pure private regime (b) as well as their
comparison are relegated to Appendix 5.3.
3.4 Growth and distribution in the mixed regime of education
3.4.1 Steady state
In this sub-section, we establish the steady-state outcome of the model in a mixed regime
of education. We assume that 1  e  2 As shown in Appendix, we can manipulate
equations (1), (2), (3), (5), (7), (8) to obtain the results depicted in Proposition 2 where
the symbol ”∗” is used to denote any steady-state value.
Proposition 2: On the steady state in the mixed regime of education:
The mixed regime of education is characterized by constant amounts of labour allocated
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to output production:
∗1 = 1 + 1  (11)
∗2 = 1 + 2
∙ + ∗
∗ + 
¸
 (12)
The expenditure ratio in private education is:
∗ = (1− )(1− )
∗
∗ +   (13)
The common rate of growth, ∗, is the solution of:
1+ (1−) ( + )(1−) +1−
(+ )(1−) (14)
= 1+ (1−)
µ

¶1+ (1−)(1−)
(1 + 1) (1 + 2)(1−)(1+ (1−) )  [(1− )(1− )] (1−)(1−) 
The relative amount of human capital, b∗ ≡ (12)∗ and consumption, b∗ ≡ (12)∗
are given by:
b∗ = " (1 + 1) (1 + 2)(1−)
# 1
1− µ 
∗
¶ 1
1− + ∗
∗ +   1 (15)
b∗ = 1 + 1
1 + 2
b∗  1 (16)
Proof: See Appendix 5.2.
Direct inspection of Proposition 2 allows us to establish the main properties of the
model in a mixed regime of education with respect to growth and distribution. We note
from equations (11) and (12) that the labour supply of individuals attending private
education is higher than that of those attending public education for two reasons: not
only is there a kind of structural break due to the change in educational regime which
leads individuals to allocate more resources to output production, but also those in private
education are the more motivated: 2  1
Thereby, status-seeking is an adequate source of heterogeneity: even if the only source
of heterogeneity is the idiosyncratic pursuit of status, this is enough to generate real
heterogeneity among individuals, with diﬀerent labour supplies, and diﬀerent choices of
education. This result is important as the very status-seeking motive also generates the
asymmetry that gives scope to status-seeking. Thus, heterogeneity is entirely due to
subjective, rather than objective, reasons (such as skills or endowments heterogeneity).
Equations (15)-(16) reveal indeed that individuals 1, who are less motivated, end up with
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a lower level of human capital, b∗  1 and consumption, b∗  1 For the latter, status-
related motivation matters in a dual way, both because of the diﬀerences in work eﬀort
(the first ratio), but also because of diﬀerences in acquired human capital (second ratio).16
As a result, inequalities in consumption are greater than inequalities in human capital.
3.4.2 The growth-inequality relationship
In this sub-section, we spell out the implications of the model for growth and discuss the
relationship between growth and distribution. Like Barro (1990), we can highlight the
fundamental tension between the productive role of government services that is beneficial
for growth and the distortionary role of the resulting taxation that is detrimental to
growth.17 In our framework, this tension is reinforced because the government sector
supports public education, which contributes to growth because of educational spillovers,
but also provides a drag to growth as it takes resources away from individuals who will
not use public education. To see this, from equation (14), we can compute:
∗
 =
∙
1
 −
(1− ) (1− )
(1− )
¸½∙
1
(1− ) +
1

¸
(+ )
 +
(+ 1− ) (+ )
 ( + )
¾−1
 (17)
The first term in brackets on the right hand side of (17), 1 , represents the positive
eﬀect of public education, which contributes to growth via the spillover eﬀect; the second
term in brackets on the right hand side, (1 − )(1 − )[(1 − )], is the resource-
withdrawal eﬀect that the tax exerts on private education, which is detrimental for growth.
Hence, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between growth and the size of the public
educational sector. Formally, maximum growth is attained if:
max = 
(1− ) (1− ) +  (18)
Thus, we can state:
Proposition 3: On the relationship between the size of the public education
sector and growth in a mixed regime of education:
If   max (  max), a larger public education sector increases (decreases) growth.
The growth-maximising tax rate reflects two factors. On the one hand, it reflects the
contribution of public services to the production of private education through the spillover
eﬀect, . As a result, the tax-maximising growth rate is increasing with  (max  0):
larger spillovers from public education are indeed synonymous with a greater contribution
of public education to the determination of the long-run level of growth. Moreover, it
16In a pure private regime, the same kind of result would apply: b∗  1 b∗  1 In a pure public
regime, however, we would obtain b∗ = 1 but as before we would obtain b∗  1 due to a lower labour
supply in output production from individuals 1 (see Appendix 5.3).
17See Futagami, Morita and Shibata, (1993), Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004), Tsoukis and Miller (2003)
for further references on this issue.
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reflects the relative size of each sector, so that the ”technical spillover” is also weighted
by the size of the group in public education, . Ceteris paribus, the greater is the number
of people attending public education, the higher the growth-maximising tax rate should
be: max  0 Thus, our analysis adds to the analysis of growth-maximising flat
income-tax rate, that has focused so far on the technical contribution of public services,
the size of the sector that utilises such services.
Our analysis also highlights the tension between the direct beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries from such services, absent in an explicit way from the original  framework
of Barro (1990). This raises political economy issues, absent in earlier analyses, which are
analysed in the next Section. Before turning to this issue, it is interesting to analyse the
eﬀects of a change in the tax rate on inequality. From equations (15) and (16), noting
that 1 − (∗)∗  0 (see (17)) and given that 0  1 − ∗(1 − )(1 − ){( +
∗)(∗ + )}  1 is always satisfied, we obtain
 b∗
 =
b∗
(1− ) 
½
1− 
∗

∙
1− 
∗(1− ) (1− ) 
(+ ∗) (∗ + )
¸¾
 0 (19)
 b∗
 =
µ
1 + 1
1 + 2
¶  b∗
  0 (20)
Equations (19) and (20) reveal that, in a mixed regime of education, inequalities in
the level of education and consumption decrease as the size of the public education sector
increases if it is suﬃciently small (  max).18 Thus, we can state:
Proposition 4: On the relationship between the size of the public education
system, growth and inequality in the mixed regime:
Since a larger public education regime always reduces inequalities, higher growth and
more equity are compatible as long as   max.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) also show that
an increase in the size of the public education sector reduces inequality and increases
growth. The crucial diﬀerence with our paper, however, is that their result is obtained
in a pure public education regime. That is, while the positive correlation between the
size of the government and economic growth in a pure public education regime seems
intuitive, such conclusion is not as obvious in a mixed regime of education. A greater
amount of resources devoted to public education means in eﬀect a greater relative cost of
investments in private education as it takes (almost mechanically) away resources (from
the more motivated individuals) which could have been invested in private education.
18From a general perspective, one should mention that at the empirical level, the issue of whether
inequality and growth are positively or negatively correlated remains open. Persson and Tabellini (1994)
present cross-country evidence of a negative eﬀect of inequality on growth. In contrast, using a panel of
US states, Partridge (1997) concludes that greater inequality is associated with greater growth. Other
studies, finally, conclude that changes in income and changes in inequality are unrelated (Deninger and
Squire, 1996; Chen and Ravallion, 1997). At a theoretical level, we can refer to Aghion, Caroli and Garcia
Penalosa (1999) who present a review of a variety of theoretical arguments on this issue.
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Therefore, this has a negative impact on investments in human capital accumulation in
the private education sector (see equation (13)) and may be growth reducing. The reason
why higher growth and lower inequality are compatible in our model is that, in the case
where the tax rate is low (  max) the productivity of additional resources devoted
to public education oﬀsets the negative impact of lower resources devoted to private
education: the economy is on the upward part of the inverted-U relationship describing
growth against the tax rate. Note that, interestingly, in this case, the more motivated
individuals compensate the increase in the size of the public sector by a greater amount
of labour devoted to output production (see equation (12)). When the tax rate is high,
in contrast, (  max), the productivity gains in the public education sector are too
small to compensate the reduction in resources devoted to the private educational sector.
This has a negative impact on growth and on the labour supply of the more motivated
individuals. We will see below that this latter case is, however, unlikely to occur in a
democratic system where the size of the government is made by a median voter.
Before turning to this issue, it is interesting to relate the result of Proposition 3 and 4 to
actual data. First of all, we can refer to the concluding remarks of Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1993) who note that Western countries have enjoyed sustained growth associated with
an evening of inequalities in the last two centuries. Taking France as an example, they
explain that the promotion of public education contributed to such a trend. Similarly, the
World Bank (1993) and Vandycke (2001) report more recent evidence fromAsian countries
in which government played an active role in the process of human capital accumulation.
They argue that in promoting public education and in guaranteeing public education for
all, the governments of these countries contributed to the rise in skills of their populations,
leading in turn to the high levels of growth observed during the period 1965-1990 and a
reduction in inequalities. More recently, Blankenau et al. (2007) validated this outcome
using panel data from 23 developed countries over the period 1960-2000.
However, the fact remains that we can observe large disparities across countries with
respect to the amount of resources spent in education. Data of OECD (2008) shows
that there is a variety of public-private education mixes across countries. More precisely,
OECD countries spend on average 5.8 percent of their GDP in education, with 84.7
percent coming from public sources and the remaining share coming from private sources.
Some countries have public education shares well above ninety percent, sometimes very
close to hundred percent such as Norway, Finland, Italy, France. In contrast, a number of
countries put a larger responsibility on the private education system like in Japan, South
Korea, UK, US and Canada among others. These large diﬀerences raise implicitly the
issue concerning the choice of the government size, i.e. the actual choice of the tax rate,
 . This task is carried out next.
3.4.3 Equilibrium in a majority voting system: choice of public education
size
In this sub-section, we determine the choice of tax rate by the median voter, that is
the amount of resources to be devoted to public education in a democratic system. To
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tackle this issue, we assume the existence of a majority voting system which allows the
government to determine the level of the income tax-rate,   To conduct the analysis,
we assume that the economy has reached the steady state. In this case, we compute
the long-run level of utility of individuals, i.e. when the labour supply of individuals 2
is constant and the growth rate of consumption equals the growth rate of human capital
and the economy-wide growth rate, ∗ From (4) we obtain:
0 = − log
¡0¢
 + (1 + )
log (0)
 +
 ( − ∗)
 +
∗
2  (21)
where we recall that 0 = (10) (20)1−, 10 = (1−)∗110, 20 = (1−∗−)∗220
and the labour supplies are given by equations (11) and (12).
We denote by   = 1 2 the income tax rate chosen by a median voter belonging
to group . Under the assumption that the parameters of the model verify 2(1+ 2)(1−
)(∗ + )2  1 (which is verified if 2 is small enough), the following applies:
Proposition 5: On the level of the tax rate in the mixed regime of education:
In a mixed regime of education, the median voter, and the democratic system in general,
set a tax rate which is less than the growth-maximising one, max Formally, we have:
2  1 max (22)
where
 1 = 
max
(1+1)(1−)
+(1−)(1−)
nh
1 + 
(1−)
i
1
∗ +
(1−)
(∗+)
o
+ 1

 2 = 
max
(1+2)(1−){[1+ (1−) ] 1∗+ (1−)(∗+)}
1− (1+2)(1−)2
(∗+)2

[+(1−)(1−)]
 + 1

Proof: Simple algebra applied to equation (21) in which we set  = 1 and  = 2, and
where 0 is taken as given, allows us to obtain  1 and  2 respectively. Simple comparisons
of the level of the diﬀerent tax rates yield (22).
Proposition 5 has several implications. Interestingly, it states that individuals prefer
a lower level of growth and a less equal society than those which are potentially possible
to achieve (under  = max). This result contrasts with the one obtained by Alesina and
Rodrik (1994). They find that in general the median voter chooses a tax rate which is
higher than the growth maximizing tax rate.
In fact there is one similarity and one diﬀerence between our result and that of Alesina
and Rodrik (1994). The similarity is that in both frameworks, in choosing the tax rate
level (  = 1 2), individuals balance the welfare losses (gains) in consumption from a
larger public sector and the gains (losses) resulting from a higher (lower) level of growth.
By construction, the growth maximising tax rate does not account for the (negative)
impact that a larger public sector has on consumption. In the framework of Alesina and
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Rodrik (1994), the marginal benefit of a greater amount of public good (i.e. a greater
tax rate) increases as the median voter becomes poorer, inducing individuals to choose a
lower growth and a more equal society. In our model, in contrast, the mechanism at work
is diﬀerent. A greater size of the government is synonymous with a welfare loss in that
individuals must sacrifice current consumption to fund the public education sector. This
means that individuals prefer a lower level of growth, but now they also implicitly prefer
and choose more inequality.
As  1 is chosen by those who use the public education system and  2 is chosen by
those who attend the private education system, it follows that  2   1  max. The
important feature is that, as we are likely to observe   max in a democratic system, we
have a possible explanation for the empirical fact discussed above whereby there seems
to be a positive relationship between government expenditure in education and the level
of economic growth. We thus can state:
Corollary 1: In democracies, we are likely to observe positively-correlated growth and
equality rates.
Another interesting result is that individuals who attend the private education system
are willing to allocate part of their income to educate the less motivated: we have  2 
0. This result is not the outcome of an altruistic behaviour. This is due to the fact
that the more motivated benefit indirectly from the public education system through the
spillover eﬀect, . In other words, the external eﬀect is partly internalised by the more
motivated individuals as they realise the positive eﬀect on long-term growth of funding
public education for the less ambitious (productive) ones.
We conclude with the implications of our analysis for societal welfare. Clearly, if the
tax rate is below (above) the preferred rates of both groups, i.e.    2 ( 1    max),
more public education increases growth, reduces inequalities and increases (decreases) the
welfare of all individuals. In either of these cases, the policy prescription is clear: the tax
rate should be changed in the direction that increases societal welfare. In the latter
case, more specifically, the tax rate should be reduced, both decreasing the growth rate
and increasing inequality; but that would increase societal welfare for the reasons given
above. If, however,  2     1, i.e. the tax rate is between the preferred rates of the
two groups, a rise in the tax rate will only benefit the less motivated, while the welfare of
the more motivated will decline. This conflict stems from the fact that the latter group
helps finance public education from which they do not benefit except indirectly (via the
educational spillover).
Viewed from an opposite angle, this implies that no group has an incentive to set a
tax rate that maximises societal welfare given by, at date zero, 0 = 10 + (1 − )20
(see (21)) Since,  = argmax0  = 1 2, it follows that  2     1 where
 = argmax0 Thus, the preferences of the two groups diﬀer, on either side of the
maximum welfare, but none has an incentive to vote for it. Furthermore, if we assume
that the less motivated group is more numerous (05    1) to capture the stylised fact
of a right-skewed motivation (and therefore income) distribution, we conclude that the
chosen tax-rate is given by  1 and verifies  1  : The actual tax rate is greater than
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the one maximising societal welfare. We can formalise this in the following Corollary:
Corollary 2: On the relation between actual and societal welfare maximizing
tax rates:
Under majority voting and a right-skewed motivation distribution ( 05    1), the
actual tax rate is greater than the welfare maxisising one:    1.
4 Conclusion
We conclude by the scope that our analysis gives. The choice between public and pri-
vate education analysed here may be thought of as a parable for the provision of public
goods in general, so that the results derived here may have a broader appeal. In par-
ticular, we may think of the public provision of health as another possible channel for
the government to improve equity and boost growth. Health represents indeed an im-
portant component of human capital: a feature firstly recognised by Grossman (1972) in
his seminal paper on demand for health and introduced in an endogenous growth model
by van Zon and Muysken (2001). On the empirical side, authors such as Weil (2005)
have provided evidence supporting the idea that health aﬀects productivity both directly
(healthier individuals make better workers) and indirectly (healthier individuals acquire
more skills). Thus, health aﬀects growth in quite a similar way as education does, and
can be formalised in a similar way as in equations (2) and (3) (for public and private
health). Therefore, our framework readily applies to health, too. Another interesting
issue would be to endogenise the threshold value of status motive which separates indi-
viduals between private and public education regimes. The framework developed here is
suitable for studying both these questions which are on the agenda for future work.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Choice of education of individuals: proof of Proposition 1
We characterise the choice of individuals regarding the education regime. First, we demon-
strate the existence and uniqueness of the level of ambition e making an individual indif-
ferent between the two regimes of education. Then, comparing the level of ambition of
any individual to this critical level, we determine her choice of education. To get there,
we assume that all individuals share the same level of ambition e with a share  choosing
the public regime and a share 1−  choosing the private regime.
Using (1), (5) and (8), with  = 0 when individuals are in public education and   0
when they are in private education, we can simplify (10) to obtain:
log


=
(1− )
 +   (23)
Recalling that  = (1)(2)1− where 1 =  and 2 =  , from equations
(3), (6) and (8), we have
( + )(1−) = 
"
(1 + e)(1− )(1− )

#(1−)µ2
1
¶−

and
 = 
Ã
1 + e

!∙ + 
 + 
¸(1−)µ2
1
¶(1−)

The two expressions for the growth rate and equation (23) make up a 3 × 3 system
in relative human capital between the two sectors of education,   = 21
growth rate, , and the level of motivation, e. As equation (23) implies that (21) =
exp[(1− )( + )], simple manipulations of these expressions yield:
() ( + )1− exp
∙
(1− ) + 
¸
= 
⎡
⎣
(1− )(1− )
³
1 + e´

⎤
⎦
1−
 (24)
and
 ( + )1−
(+ )1− exp
∙
−(1− ) (1− ) + 
¸
=


³
1 + e´  (25)
Eliminating the term (1 + e) between equations (24) and (25), we obtain:
() 1− (+ )1− ( + ) exp
∙ [+ (1− ) (1− )]
 + 
¸
=  1− (1− )(1− ) 
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This condition shows that a solution for   0 (and thus for e  0 and 21  1)
exists and is unique. That is, if the level of ambition of individuals is given by e : not
only individuals are indiﬀerent between private and public education but, also, a share
 of individuals chooses public education and a share 1 −  opts for private education.
Therefore, Proposition 1 follows.
5.2 Steady-state in the mixed regime of education
In the mixed regime of education, the less motivated opt for the public regime, while the
more motivated opt for the private regime. Thus, equations (2) and (3) imply:
 = 
µ
1 + 1

¶µ
1 + 2

¶(1−) ∙ + 
 + 
¸(1−) ³ b´−(1−) 
and
 = 
∙(1 + 2)(1− )
(1−  − ∗)
¸1−
( b)
Gathering the results depicted above allows us to determine the implicit value of the
growth rate, ∗ We obtain
1+ (1−) ( + )(1−) +1−
(+ )(1−)
= 1+ (1−)
µ

¶1+ (1−)(1−)
(1 + 1) (1 + 2)(1−)(1+ (1−) )  [(1− )(1− )] (1−)(1−) 
which is the solution given in equation (14) or
+ 1− ( + )1−+
(+ )
= 1+ 1−
µ

¶1−+ 
1−
(1− )1− (1 + 1) 1− (1 + 2)1−+(1− )1− () 1− 
depending on how we eliminate b It can easily be checked that the two expressions are
exactly the same. The second one is simply the first one to the power (1− ) Simple
algebra shows that a solution for ∗ =  =  with ∗  0 exists and is unique. The
human capital ratio, the consumption ratio, and the quantities of labour follow directly
from (1), (2), (5), (7), (8).
5.3 Outcome in a pure public and pure private regime
We depict the outcome of the model in a pure public education regime and in a pure
private regime of education, respectively. In the case of a pure public regime (case (a) in
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proposition 1), all individuals get the same level of human capital: b∗ = 1. The level of
growth follows from (6) and is thus given by:
 =  (1 + 1)
 (1 + 2)(1−)  (26)
Moreover, from (1) where ∗ = 0 the consumption ratio, b∗ is given by:
b∗ = 12 = 12 = 1 + 11 + 2  (27)
Similarly, the growth rate in a pure private regime (part (b) of Proposition 1) is given
by:  = (∗)1−() for all , where we recall that ∗ = ∗1 = ∗2 (see
(13)) Taking the ratio of this equation for a typical individual 1 and a typical individual
2, respectively, we obtain:
b∗ = 12 =
µ1
2
¶(1−)
=
µ
1 + 1
1 + 2
¶(1−)
 (28)
Using (28), (8) and  = (1) (2)1−  we obtain:
¡¢ ¡ + ¢1− =  ∙(1− )(1− )
¸1−
(1 + 1)(1−) (1 + 2)(1−)(1−)  (29)
and b∗ = 12 = 12 12 =
µ
1 + 1
1 + 2
¶1
 (30)
From the above results, we note that the pure public educational regime produces
more growth than the pure private one at least if ( =) (1 + 1) (1 + 2)(1−)  
[(1 + 1)(1 + 2)(1−) (1− ) (1 − )]1−( ) (see (26) and (29)), given that
 +  is likely to be lower than one. The following parameter changes increase the
probability of the public regime growth rate being higher than the private regime rate:
A higher tax rate, higher disutility of labour relative to the productivity parameter in
output sector, , and a lower level of status motivation and ambition. Moreover, the
private-education regime produces always more income inequality than the public regime.
Inequality becomes larger if the spillover eﬀect in education (captured by ) is low (see
equations (27) and (30)).
5.4 Transitional dynamics in the mixed regime of education
We characterise the transitional dynamics of the model in a mixed regime of education.
We assume that the choice of education regime is made once and for all at the beginning
of the planning horizon ( = 0) for all individuals. We note that the growth rate of those
in public education is given by:  = (1)(2)(1−)( b)−1 where we used  =
20
(1) (2)1− and denoted by b ≡ 12 which is a constant variable in steady state.
Similarly, the growth rate in private education is given by:  =  (22)1− ( b)
Then, denoting by  ≡ 2(1 −  − 2) the relative amount of resources allocated to
education and consumption (which is constant in steady state), we can manipulate the
first order conditions of an individual opting for private education (see sub-section 3.2)
with the law of motion of human capital in the private sector (3) to obtain:
(1 + 2) (1− )
 = 22
2 = 1 + 2 (1 + ) 
(1 + 2) () = 2 (1− )
µ
(1 + 2) (1− )
¶1−
(1) (2)1− 
(1− ) 
µ
1
 + 1
¶
= −
•2
2 + 
Manipulation of the above equations yields the following 2× 2 system in ( b, ):
• = 
⎧
⎨
⎩

 +

 (1 + 1) (1 + 2)1− (1 + )(1−) ( b)−1
+
h
(1− )− (1−)
i h(1+2)(1−)

i1−
( b)
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
•b = b
⎧
⎨
⎩

 (1 + 1) (1 + 2)1− (1 + )(1−) ( b)−1
−
h(1+2)(1−)

i1−
( b)
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
Taking a first order Taylor approximation of the above system around the steady state,
we obtain:
⎛
⎝
•
•b b
⎞
⎠ =
µ  − ∗b − b∗
¶
, (31)
where “∗” indicates the steady-state value of any variable and we have used the steady-
state property  = ∗ = (1 + 1)(1 + 2)1−(1 + ∗)(1−)( b∗)−1  = ∗ =
[(1 + 2)(1 − )∗]1−( b∗), ∗ = (1 − )∗(∗ + ) Lastly, the matrix  is
given by:
 =
Ã (1−)∗
1+∗ +
¡
1− + 1∗
¢ (1−)∗
∗ −(1−)
∗
∗
¡
1− + 1∗
¢
[(1− )∗ − (1− ) (1 + ∗)] ∗∗(1+∗) −∗ (1− + )
!

Using ∗ = (1 − )∗(∗ + ) we notice that (1 − )∗ − (1 − )(1 + ∗) =
(1−)[(1−)∗−(∗+)−(1−)∗](∗+) = −(1−)(∗+)(∗+)  0 Using
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this information, direct inspection of the matrix reveals that its determinant is strictly
negative meaning that its eigenvalues are real and have opposite signs. Hence, the unique
steady-state equilibrium is a saddle point stable. The linearised system (31) is indeed
characterised by one predetermined variable, b ≡ 12, and one non predetermined
(free to jump) variable,  ≡ 2(1−  − 2)
To refine our results and analyse the eﬀects of a change in income tax both on impact
and during the transition, we calibrate the model choosing benchmark parameter values
(see third column of Table 1) for which, as observed in OECD countries, total expenditures
as a percentage of GDP is roughly equal to five percent. By means of numerical methods,
we show that for a wide range of values, reported in the fourth column of Table 1, the
sign of eigenvalues remains identical.
Table 1: Baseline parameter values
Description Parameter Benchmark values Range
Income tax   = 005 [001; 01]
Human capital spill-over   = 01 [005; 07]
Skills parameter
in education
  = 013 [002; 02]
Share of individuals   = 07 [01; 09]
Productivity in output sector   = 035 [005; 04]
Marginal disutility
of labour
  = 13 [1; 5]
Discount rate   = 005 [001; 007]
Taste for status 1  2 1 = 02 = 005 [0; 5]
Using the benchmark parameter values (third column in Table 1), we can compute
the steady-state values of growth, relative human capital and consumption, the share of
income individuals of group 2 spend in private education, the quantity of labour supplied
by each type of individual and the threshold level of preference for status. Results are
summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Steady-state outcome for the parameter values
∗ b∗ b∗ ∗ ∗1 ∗2 e
000183107 0932541 0888134 00302051 0769231 0807692 00454302
Denoting by   = 1 2 the eigenvalues of  , simulation exercise leads to
1 = 154481  0; 2 = −000189961  0
That is, as mentioned above, while one eigenvalue is positive, the other is negative. The
stable arm corresponds to the eigenvector associated with the negative eigenvalue. As the
corresponding matrix of eigenvectors is given by
 =
∙
0999484 00246064
−00321101 0999697
¸

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we conclude that, around the steady state, the slope of the saddle arm is positive. With
this information in mind, we can analyse the impact of a change in income tax rate,  ,
on b ≡ 12 and  ≡ 2(1−  − 2) both on impact and along the transition.
To proceed, we assume that the government decides to increase marginally and per-
manently the tax rate level,  . We restrict our attention to the case   max initially.
This is indeed the most plausible scenario given that the "democratic" tax rate (either  1
or  2) necessarily falls below the growth maximizing one (see Proposition 5). Using the
results derived previously and from the simulation exercise, we can infer that, on impact,
 jumps down on the new saddle path and, afterwards, sluggishly increases to its new
steady state, i.e. approaches it from below.
Regarding the human capital ratio (state variable), there is no change on impact. Fol-
lowing the marginal increase of the tax rate, we can nevertheless deduce that it increases
after impact. That is, along the transition, b increases progressively to its new steady
state and attains it from below. To summarise, when   max following an increase in
the tax rate level, both types of individuals experience an increase in their human capital
growth. The diﬀerence is that the boost for the less motivated individuals surpasses the
boost for the more motivated individuals. It thus results in a reduction of inequalities in
human capital along the transition to the new steady state.
From the results above, it is straightforward to identify the eﬀects of a change in  on
consumption, , on impact for both types of individuals. From the resource constraint
(1):  = (1 −  − ), and equations (11), (12) and (13), it emerges that, on
impact, consumption drops down for both types of individuals. Moreover, it is easy to
check that, for those in public education, labour supply remains unchanged; for those in
private education, in contrast, labour supply can either increase or decrease depending on
whether the jump of  is positive or negative. Therefore, we conclude that, although a
marginal increase in the amount of resources devoted to public education induces welfare
gains in the long run, its immediate eﬀect (i.e. on impact) is always welfare reducing for
the less motivated (poorer) individuals; the immediate impact on the welfare of the more
motivated (richer) ones may be ambiguous.
5.5 A more general technology in public education
In this Appendix, we slightly modify the model by specifying a more general technol-
ogy of education in the public sector, such as:
•
 = 
¡¢1− ¡¢  where  =
(1) (2)1−. We will show that we would obtain the same results as in the simplified
model used in the main text. For simplicity, we focus on the mixed regime of education
in steady state. An important feature is that the behaviour of individuals described in
the main text remains unchanged. The only diﬀerence is that, in steady state, the level
of growth in public education (6) is now replaced by
 =  ()1− ()1−
µ
1 + 1

¶(1−)µ
1 + 2

¶(1−)(1−) ∙ + 
 + 
¸(1−)(1−) ³ b´−(1−) 
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where we have used  =   = 1 2, with  given by (5) and (8) for individuals
1 and 2, respectively. Recalling that the level of growth in private education is given by
 = {(1 + 2)(1− )[(1−  − )]}1−( b) we follow the same line of reasoning as
before Using (13), the growth rate in private education is given by:
 = 
∙(1 + 2)(1− )(1− )
 ( + )
¸1−
( b)
Eliminating b we obtain:
()(1+ 1−) ( + )(1−)(1+)
(+ )(1−) = 
(1−)(1+ 1−) ()1+ (1−)1− (1− )1−−(1−)

1++ 2
1−

×(1 + 2)(1−)(1+) (1 + 1) 
2(1−)
1− (1− )1− () (1−)1− 
Simple algebra allows us to show that the growth rate which is solution of this equation
has the same properties as those described in the main text. In particular, we obtain an
inverted U-shaped relation between the long run growth rate, , and the tax rate,  .
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